Showing posts with label Global Macro. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Global Macro. Show all posts

11.03.2010

Mid-term elections, QE and the markets: Tea and QE | The Economist

But there is also a nice irony at work. The tea party is opposed to massive government spending and bailouts. But QE is a way for the central bank to finance that government spending and to pump money into the banking sector. So on the day that the tea partiers may be celebrating, an unelected central bank will be carrying out a programme, probably totalling several hundred billion dollars, that will cut against everything the partiers stand for.

Buttonwood accurately foresaw the overwhelming victory of the Tea Baggers and we are now mere hours from the likely Federal Reserve announcement of QE2 and the resumption of the printing press. The irony observed in the above excerpt - that the Fed is poised to undermine everything the Tea Baggers fundamentally stand on through its independent monetary authority - is unlikely to be fully appreciated by the media as the day progresses. It will be interesting to see the response of the freshly invigorated GOP activists in the coming weeks leading up to their inauguration early next year. I suspect the radical tone will be subdued by political realities and market uncertainty, not to mention the radical shift in mindset that accompanies a transition from insurgent to incumbent.

Posted via email from Global Macro Blog

9.21.2010

Global Macro News 9.20.2010

Asia-Pacific
Japan intervenes to devalue the Yen (FT.com)
In Depth Report: Japanese Intervention (FT.com)
USD/JPY Weekly Outlook Sept 20-24 (Forex Crunch)
China: What do the "good" trade numbers tell us? (China Financial Markets)
Are There More Middle-Class Households in India or in China? (Next Big Future)


EU
Poland Ready To Take "Brutal" Steps on Foreign Currency Loans (Bloomberg)
Hungarian Forint Touches Record Low (ForexBlog)
Hungary faces downgrade of debt to junk status (Bloomberg)


US
Federal Reserve Resumes Open Market Operations (Federal Reserve Bank of New York)
End of Recession / No End of Private Sector Deleveraging (EconompicData)
The Only Part That Mattered In  Obama's Telethon (Market Ticker)
Ask Not Whether Governments Will Default, but How (Safe Haven)
El-Erian on the interesting week ahead (FT Alphaville)
Entitlements, Taxes, Inequality and Three-Way Class Warfare (Of Two Minds)

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8.24.2010

Forbes.com - Say Yes to the Yen - Shawn Baldwin

Forbes.com


Say Yes To The Yen
Shawn Baldwin 08.17.10, 4:55 AM ET

The Japanese yen recently rallied to 15-year highs against the U.S. dollar along with hitting highs against other major currencies. Throughout the economic crisis, the yen has continued to display strength; while other currencies have seen their gains reduced significantly, the yen has gained over 40% since the economic crisis began--almost 8% of that has been over the last 2 months.

Why does the yen continue to rise?

Because of narrowing interest rate differentials, concerns about the world economic outlook and the possibility of intervention.

Japan's finance minister has allayed those fears, stating that the yen's rise continues to be set by the markets. It is easy to understand why some feel that the Minister would want to intervene. The rising yen against the dollar makes Japanese goods considerably more expensive for American consumers--Japan Inc.’s largest export customer.

The continued strengthening of the yen makes the revenue earned from Japanese companies' U.S. subsidiaries worth less when the repatriated revenues are converted from dollars into yen. This has already caused Japan's business groups to cry out for a reduction in tax rates--but surprisingly, to be steadfast in supporting no intervention.

The currency’s strength certainly isn’t due to Japanese domestic economic strength. Instead, the yen's strength is a by-product of private sector recycling of the current account surplus and international purchases of Japanese assets. U.S. dollar weakness is a strong factor, and that suggests that intervention on the bilateral pair may not be successful.

This makes it highly unlikely that the Bank of Japan will intervene. The last time that the BOJ intervened to weaken the yen was in 2003, when over the course of 126 days the Ministry of Finance sold yen in the open market to purchase $315 billion. These measures eventually sent the yen 11% lower.

However, overall success of interventions in changing the long-term path of a currency is less certain--and they only seem to work when nations coordinate their efforts--highly unlikely in this environment. From a historical basis, the G-8 industrialized countries have not intervened in the foreign exchange markets throughout the economic crisis, making intervention impractical and not politically feasible.

So do not expect Japan's Minister of Finance to intervene--unless the yen strengthens beyond 84.8, the multiyear high set last November after the Dubai sovereign debt shock.

Because the yen's strength may aggravate existing disinflationary forces, the prudent course of action would be to increase Japanese government bond purchases in combination with an expansion of policies to accelerate international buying of the instruments.

For all the latest headlines visit Forbes Asia.


One more reason the yen may continue to appreciate: China's activity. Recent data from Japan shows that China has increased its holdings of Japanese Government Bonds (JGBs) by $6.2 billion in the first trimester of 2010, more than double its previous record in 2005. China bought more JGBs than it sold for the first half of the year, the biggest annual increase since 2005. China then purchased a net 456.4 billion yen ($5.3 billion) of JGB’s in June, following record net buying of 735.2 billion yen in May, according to the Japanese Ministry of Finance.

Japan has also reported large purchases of yen money-market accounts by nonresidents--a total of $10.7 billion from July 11to 17. It would be prudent to assume that a number of these purchases are being made by the Chinese. Because China now says that it pegs its currency to a basket of currencies and not the U.S. dollar, this could tactically be an ideal time for China to readjust its $2.5 trillion dollar reserve portfolio away from the greenback.

China isn’t the largest holder of yen--the U.K. is, and London bought over 26.3 trillion yen last year and have invested another 18.3 trillion yen this year, further powering the currency. Given the weakening U.S. dollar in a soft economy, this creates an opportunity for traders. Expect investors to fuel the yen’s rally and continue to propel the currency to record highs.

Shawn Baldwin is chairman of Capital Management Group, an investment advisory and research firm based in Chicago. Neither he nor his family nor CMG own Japanese government bonds.

For all the latest headlines visit Forbes Asia.

Posted via email from Global Macro Blog

8.18.2010

Michael Novogratz of Fortress Investments on Opalesque.TV (Part 3)

Michael Novogratz of Fortress Investments on OpalesqueTV (Part II)

Malta continues to grow market share in ucits hedge funds - Hedge Funds Review

Malta is considered the newcomer to Ucits hedge funds, although the country’s service providers were well acquainted with the products before EU membership in 2004. Joining up gave Malta’s financial services industry a stamp of approval. This also meant Ucits funds could be passported to other EU member states.

Malta implemented the Ucits III regime immediately on accession. Malta’s choice as a domicile for a Ucits hedge fund is usually based on several factors including the efficiency and flexibility of the Malta Financial Services Authority (MFSA), quality support services available in the jurisdiction, relatively low set-up and maintenance costs and an exemption from income tax and capital gains tax at fund level and at non-resident investor level, irrespective of the legal form adopted. There is a possibility to set up self-managed funds and fund managers may be established as a Maltese company which allows tax refunds on distribution of dividends. Finally Malta, like other jurisdictions, offers the possibility to redomicile a fund from elsewhere relatively easily. A fund can migrate to Malta without having to be wound up, subject to certain relatively straightforward conditions.

Since EU accession Malta has also built up its hedge funds business. Dermot Butler at Custom House Global Fund Services, the Malta-based parent company of Custom House Group of Companies, says the jurisdiction is basically in the same place Ireland was 15-20 years ago when it first started its funds business. Then people said Ireland had little chance of challenging Luxembourg, remembers Butler, but Ireland went after the alternative sides and built up what has become the leading jurisdiction for fund administration of hedge funds and other alternatives products.

Malta has built up its hedge fund business primarily by attracting the smaller start-ups and emerging managers. The attraction is not just price, although some aspects of Malta’s offering may be cost competitive compared with Ireland and Luxembourg. One of its main selling points, if not the key one, is the regulator. The MFSA has a reputation for having the time to listen to ideas from managers thinking of setting up a fund structure in Malta. It is universally acclaimed to be open and approachable, flexible yet firm. This is a regulator, say those operating in Malta, that takes a sensible no--nonsense approach to regulation.

When applied to Ucits, MFSA is seen as keen to adhere to the spirit as well as the letter of the law. This is important. Some regulators in the EU, say many in Malta, tend to bend the rules in order to allow hedge fund strategies to use a Ucits wrapper even though there is more than a question mark about their suitability as a Ucits product.

The MFSA is still flexible in discussing terms with funds looking to set up a Ucits structure. However, it will seek “comfort” from other regulators or informally consult the committee of European securities regulators (Cesr) if it has questions over the suitability of the structure. “The MFSA is not afraid of referring or consulting. It doesn’t just approve a fund and let the operator face the music,” says Andre Zerafa, a partner at Ganado & Associates.

If there is any doubt that another regulator might not agree with the interpretation of Ucits being used, Zerafa believes there is an obligation to ensure other regulators in the EU will accept the structure. Otherwise, points out Zerafa, a fund could find it is rejected in another jurisdiction and that could cause problems. “The regulator should ensure that if a fund is given a licence it can be passported without any problem,” he says. There have been cases of a jurisdiction giving the green light to a suspect structure only to have other jurisdictions reject it.

Some like Zerafa wonder whether Ucits is a structure suitable for the majority of hedge funds. “Most hedge fund mangers would find it difficult to convert their hedge funds into Ucits hedge funds. It imposes conditions and restrictions they are not used to. At the moment hedge funds are not used to restrictions on how they managing their portfolios. Opening a Ucits hedge fund is a bit like a sex change operation for them. It is not something they do lightly,” notes Zerafa.

Joseph Saliba at law firm MAMO TCV agrees: “There is a question of Ucits hedge funds. To us it is a strange animal.” He says that some hedge fund strategies clearly cannot be made to fit within Ucits: “Ucits hedge funds still need to be tested by the MFSA to ensure the promoter is following the directive’s rules and there are no hiccups.” He points out that the MFSA also is proactive in issuing guidelines and notes to explain its reasoning when implementing directives as well as Maltese regulations.

Zerafa thinks the reason funds are looking at Ucits products reflects the uncertainty over the alternative investment fund managers (AIFM) directive stuck in Brussels. Under Ucits there is at least some certainty, he admits, compared with the uncertainty of whether offshore funds or even onshore regulated funds like Malta’s professional investor funds (PIFs) will be allowed when AIFM finally hits the statute books. PIFs are not regulated as tightly as Ucits funds and are targeted at financially literate investors. Hedge funds, private equity funds and property funds are normally structured as PIFs. These funds can be set up as standard or self-managed schemes.

He points out that if AIFM allows funds that comply with the -directive to be passported across the EU, that could be a better alternative to Ucits, particularly if the fund can operate under a less restrictive regime.

Simon Tortell of Simon Tortell & Associates thinks under Ucits IV, Malta. like others, may find that a master/feeder structure becomes the norm, particularly for US-based hedge fund managers. Under this the master would remain Cayman or -Delaware--domiciled with a feeder fund that is Ucits compliant to allow easier access by European investors.

Tortell also thinks Malta will be well-placed to take advantage of other aspects of Ucits IV, particularly as the country has always allowed hedge funds to outsource services to other EU jurisdictions. This means, for example, that a management company set up under Ucits IV in Malta could keep its fund administration in Luxembourg or Ireland.

Something everyone agrees on in Malta is the lack of choice of custodian. Without a wider selection beyond the two main providers – local domestic Bank of Valletta and international HSBC – few believe Malta will be able to attract a large number of Ucits hedge funds or platforms offering a quick route to a Ucits structure.

While HSBC is recognised worldwide, Bank of Valletta is less well known. “It is a question of a chicken and egg situation,” explains Saliba. “In this case the first step is the custodian which is the chicken. You have them and the eggs, the Ucits funds, will follow.”

Negotiations with a number of global custodians are underway with Malta and many confidently expect at least small operations by a few of them to open before the end of the year. The idea would be to have a relatively small presence and gear up once the business comes in.

Ucits funds are the new black in the Hedge Fund universe. Malta is the the forgotten treasure of Europe, and it has Ucits too.

Posted via email from Global Macro Blog

Say Yes To The Yen - Forbes.com

Japan's currency will continue its climb.


image

Shawn Baldwin

The Japanese yen recently rallied to 15-year highs against the U.S. dollar along with hitting highs against other major currencies. Throughout the economic crisis, the yen has continued to display strength; while other currencies have seen their gains reduced significantly, the yen has gained over 40% since the economic crisis began--almost 8% of that has been over the last 2 months.

Why does the yen continue to rise?

See the full article at http://www.forbes.com/2010/08/17/yen-currency-foreign-exchange-markets-econom....

Posted via email from Global Macro Blog

Michael Novogratz of Fortress Investments on OpalesqueTV

Fed's Kocherlakota: Markets misinterpreted FOMC’s decision

From Minneapolis Fed President Narayana Kocherlakota: Inside the FOMC

The FOMC’s decision has had a larger impact on financial markets than I would have anticipated. My own interpretation is that the FOMC action led investors to believe that the economic situation in the United States was worse than they, the investors, had imagined. In my view, this reaction is unwarranted. The FOMC’s decisions were largely predicated on publicly available data about real GDP, its various components, unemployment, and inflation. I would say that there is no new information about the current state of the economy to be learned from the FOMC’s actions or its statement.
Kocherlakota points out that the Fed's balance sheet was falling quicker than anticipated because of the high level of refinancing as mortgage rates have declined.

But Kocherlakota fails to note that the mortgage rates have declined because of the weaker economy - and the Fed appears to be behind the curve in adjusting their views lower.

Kocherlakota is forecasting that real GDP growth in the 2nd half of 2010 will be about the same as in the first half:

Based on estimates from our Minneapolis forecasting model, I expect GDP growth to be around 2.5 percent in the second half of 2010 and close to 3.0 percent in 2011. There is a recovery under way in the United States, and I expect it to continue.
Although Kocherlakota forecast is possible - and is a weak recovery - I think the economy will slow in the 2nd half.

And I think the growing view isn't that the economy is worse than investors had imagined, but that the Fed is once again behind the curve on the economic outlook.

Has the market been overreacting to the FOMC's most recent announcement that it will be freezing its balance sheet at current $2.5T by using returns from mortgage-backed securities bought following the collapse of Bear, Lehman and AIG to buy 5- and 10-year treasuries, maintaining its loosy-goosy monetary policy?

Dubbed QE2-lite the FOMC announcement outlined a hybrid of the more radical and oft predicted 'QE2' expansion of the Fed balance sheet, which presumably would have grown to $5T, all in an effort to fight off deflation and unfreeze long-suffering credit markets in the western world. If this sounds like its a 'last-resort' strategy, that's because it is precisely that.

I believe the markets are beginning to prove that the LARGE fundamental underlying problems suffering the international economic and political systems are no longer distant matters for another generation, they are immediate mortal threats to mankind and we are stuck with the current crop of partisan-obsessed talking heads who we all know are bound to fail us terribly whether tomorrow or a year from now..

Posted via email from Global Macro Blog

8.06.2010

And Then There Were Two: Rumor Romer Resigning From Obama Economic Think Tank | zero hedge

First Orszag, now Romer? If the latest rumor about the imminent defection of one of the three remaining policy stalwarts is true, it means the administration's economic policy is on the verge of collapse. Hotline Oncall reports: "Christina Romer, chairwoman of Pres. Obama's Council of Economic Advisers, has decided to resign, according to a source familiar with her plans. Romer, an economics professor at the University of California (Berkeley) before taking the key admin post, did not respond to repeated calls to her office." The sad reality is that Romer's (who has largely been a mere figurehead and staffed to provide soundbites to CNBCs how every worsening NFP report is in reality a dramatic improvement, a job which even Steve Liesman can do with a passing grade) departure will only make the remaining two people in Obama's economic circle, Tim Geithner and Larry Summers, even more powerful. Why couldn't those two leave? Surely both have by now earned their $2.5 million a year job at Goldman... We now anticipate the 8-K from Whitehouse Corp announcing the appointment of Paul Krugman and Mark Zandi to fill the newly vacant positions.

More from Hotline Oncall:
"She has been frustrated," a source with insight into the WH economics team said. "She doesn't feel that she has a direct line to the president. She would be giving different advice than Larry Summers [director of the National Economic Council], who does have a direct line to the president."
"She is ostensibly the chief economic adviser, but she doesn't seem to be playing that role," the source said. The WH has been pounded for its faulty forecast that unemployment would not top 8% after its economic stimulus proposal passed.
Instead, the jobless rate is 9.5%, after exceeding 10% last year. It was "a horribly inaccurate forecast," said Bert Ely, a banking consultant. "You have to wonder why Summers isn't the one that should be taking the fall. But Larry is a pretty good bureaucratic infighter."

Another abrupt exit from the West Wing economic team has left the Obama Administration scrambling for excuses and Ms Romer verbalizing very familiar frustrations to her colleague Peter Orzag, recently retired Budget Czar. Unfortunately, we are stuck with tweedle-dee (Tiny Tim) and tweedle-dumbo (Summers) now and their dominance over the presidents thought on economic policy has only been buffeted by Romer's abrupt exit.

7.09.2010

PolyMac Global Macro Fund Review | 7.9.10




  • FT.com | Paulson's flagship funds hit by volatility The world's greatest hedge fund manager, John Paulson, and the largest beneficiary of the global financial crisis to this point has seen tougher times thus far in 2010. Flagship Paulson & Co Advantage Fund is down -5.8% year to date, and the Paulson Recovery Fund lost -9/9% in May and -12.39% June. The only fund up on the year to date is the Gold Fund (+13% ytd). Other global macro icons have struggled in the current environment as well, with Louis Bacon's Moore Capital down -6.9% ytd, while Paul Tudor Jones' BVI Global fund has fallen -1.8% ytd.


  • Reuters | Oakley backs macro hedge funds in volatile environment According to Teun Johnston of the Oakley Opportunities fund of hedge funds, which launched last week, global macro funds should do well under current market conditions. So far Oakley has allocated 20-percent of its $250mm AUM in macro funds. 


  • HedgeCo.net | Galtene Ltd expands, opens fund in Europe NYC fund specializing in commodity-based global macro strategies with over $1B AUM has hired Werner Schnenemann to manage their new Giltene AG fund, which will be based out of Switzerland. 

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    7.02.2010

    Unemployment falls, but little to be encouraged by in June non farm payrolls

    PolyMac's predictions of six-digit increases in job loses and an uptick of the national unemployment rate to 9.7% proved to be half correct, with a net of 125,000 jobs lost, but a slight decrease by one tenth of a percent in the unemployment rate to 9.5%.

    Washington Post:
    Unemployment rate falls, but momentum weak in job market: "The jobless rate was 9.5 percent last month, down from 9.7 percent in May, a surprising decrease that came as hundreds of thousands of workers dropped out of the labor force. Private employers added 83,000 jobs in June, more than double the rate in May but still below the six-figure job creation numbers that would suggest a strong recovery in employment.

    Overall, employers shed 125,000 jobs in June; however, that figure was distorted by the Census Bureau cutting 225,000 temporary jobs. The total of 100,000 jobs added, excluding the Census, is lower than the 130,000 or so jobs needed every month just to keep up with growth in the labor force, which could put upward pressure on the jobless rate in the months ahead."
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    6.30.2010

    RBS: Get Ready For The “Cliff Edge”

    I’ve read some alarming research in recent weeks and months, but this one takes the cake.  RBS is sounding the alarm on risk assets with a call that markets are at risk of falling off the edge of the cliff.  They refer to equity investors as the “worst cult in history….which has no basis in fact, or history, but yet seems universally accepted.”  (There’s actually a strange truth in that comment).  They believe the current downturn could very well “destroy” this “cult”:

    “Get ready for the cliff-edge. Be maximum long duration of nominal government bonds in safe haven markets. This means US, UK, Germany, in that order, and perhaps others. Be long gold. Think the unthinkable – we always do, and you should ask yourself why the consensus refuses to do so, and seems perpetually on the ‘everything is ok’ side of events. If I was any more bond bullish we would explode, this is identical to 2008, including the incredible complacent (and we believe wrong) consensus.

    They’re not just bullish on treasuries – they are super bulls with a 2% target on 10 year yields:

    “Get ready for sub 2% on 10-yr USTs; sub 2% on 10-yr bunds; and the UK not far behind, 2.5% 10-yr Gilts. Our long held US$2000 gold view as a trade for the breakdown of the financial system looks increasingly ok. We cannot stress enough how strongly we believe that a cliff-edge may be around the corner, for the global banking system (particularly in Europe), and for the global economy (particularly in the US/Europe). We have been wrong before, but we think the risks associated with us being wrong are low (ie, rates just stay where they are, yields back up a little bit, after all we are not about to enter a new global economic upswing!). The risks associated with us being right are >10% returns in 10-yr USTs at the same time that equities/commodities will collapse far beyond what even some equity bears anticipate.”

    In terms of valuations they don’t see today’s levels as being particularly attractive:

    “For a counter consensus look at just how rich equities actually are if we are right about the economy, and how far they can fall, look at Robert Shiller’s 10-yr real adjusted P/E ratio on the S&P500, which uses ten year smoothed earnings. We have used this as our marker for proper (unbiased) long-term valuations for many years – and is freely available to all investors to look for themselves on his Yale website – and it sits at 20.0. One pillar of our framework is that sometimes it is right to buy equity; sometimes it is right to sell equity. And call us old fashioned, but we will buy at low PEs, and sell at high PEs. So a PE now of 20, sits very uncomfortably right at the TOP of its range if we take out the pre-first great depression spike in 1929 and Nasdaq 2000 spike. We argued in 2007/08 pre crunch that we would buy equities again when they looked cheap, which would be at 6-8 PE on this metric. That is an equity fall of 60-70% from here. Fine, call us mad with such big numbers if you desire, and say we will miss the big equity rally on a structural view (what rally, having been short for 10 years, S&P500 total return since 1Jan2000 is actually -8.1%!). Meanwhile an investment in 30yr USTs has returned you +126%. You do not have to see -60-70% off risk assets to be cautious here, we are just suggesting this is what the numbers say are attainable if certain circumstances prevail, using a 120 year snapshot. The big turnover in the US economy will lead to dramatic turns down in valuations we suspect – and may finally destroy the world’s worst cult: the cult of the equity, which has no basis in fact, or history, but yet seems universally accepted.”

    What’s this all add up to?  They believe the endgame approaches:

    “This all sounds somewhat doomsdayish, so we should update how the real economy/banking is panning out for us. It is saying: the end-game approaches.”

    RBS says housing is in the lynch pin in the whole economy and that the next leg down will trigger the collapse:

    “First, we have been waiting for the last of the US fiscal easings, the first time homebuyer tax credit, to pass, and have been arguing strongly for some weeks to investors to get ready for the violent turn down which is about to occur. And the trigger (not the only reason, but the trigger) is the US housing market. This is all falling into place lovely. Last week saw the NAHB housing index dip; housing starts at -10%mom (6.3% under consensus), and building permits -5.9%mom (8.4% under consensus). This week has seen existing home sales -2.2% (8.2% under consensus); and new home sales -32.7%mom (14% under consensus). Our theme is building. The BoE financial stability report today shows there is a surplus of 1.75m housing units built since 2006 and even with normal household creation, this will take two years to remove. So the weak housing theme should now pollute its way into consumers, and kickstart the rebuilding of the savings rate (just 3.6% and delayed from rebuilding by the fiscal/monetary shock and awe).”

    The problems don’t stop there though.  The banking system is still a mess:

    “Second, the European banking system faces problems. We have seen downgrades continue in Europe this week. We discussed in last week’s weekly overview about the US$450bn shortage of dollar asset funding for non-US banks, and why the Fed had to reopen swap lines. We are amazed there is not now immense market & media focus on the new letters that will bring forward the end-game and worsen it: 2a-7.”

    It gets even worse (amazingly).  They believe the implementation of SEC rule 2a-7 could be what pushes us off the edge of the cliff:

    “What is this? The new (well ‘new’, it comes in on 30 June but has been known for a year despite no-one discussing it at all) SEC rule. This forces US money market funds – up to now the provider of USD liquidity to those who need it – to become ‘safer’. The SEC puts it thus: ‘The amendments tighten the risk-limiting conditions imposed on tax exempt money market funds by rule 2a-7…the amendments are designed to reduce the likelihood that a tax exempt fund will not be able to maintain a stable net asset value.’ (source: SEC). Our short-term strategists plan a piece next week. The key for us in FI is that these US$2.8trn of 2a-7 funds now have to a) own 30%, not 5%, of assets in sub 7 day liquid paper; b) weighted average maturity of fund has to fall to 60 from 90 days. We can all see the logic – the sovereign defaults from EMU have the power to hit EMU banks badly, and the USA does not want to repeat the calamitous ‘breaking the buck’ problem when in 2008 Reserve Primary Fund wrote down its Lehman assets, took its net asset value sub $1, caused a run
    on money funds which then forced them to sell their assets, cutting NAV for other funds, etc. Contagion.

    From what we can see, the USA is basically pulling up the drawbridge and retreating into its fortress, trying to protect its financial system from coming European banking problems. But the consequence is clear. Banking is about confidence. If you are reliant on markets to fund yourself and that confidence wanes, a total stop can occur immediately/within days. Northern Rock (75% reliant on wholesale markets) was the first example of this in the UK, though not the last. Once we apply 2a-7 (and the ability of US money funds to ‘put’ their EMU bank assets back to the issuer EMU banks within 7 days on signs of trouble, since the US money funds will from now on increasingly own 1yr securities with a 7 day put) to our economic slowdown/deflation themes, this means one thing. If there is a slowdown and sovereign trouble, the problems facing EMU banking have through this rule potentially become a whole lot worse. This worsens – and brings forward – the ‘cliff edge’ potential.”

    And what will be the result of the collapse?  “Monster” quantitative easing:

    “Monster QME coming. With fiscal policy off the agenda, we have always expected more QME (quantitative monetary easing). And this time will be different. We have always argued that buying of bonds is less efficient than guaranteeing yield levels, and that yields are the key, not raising money supply, given demand for credit is dead (so all QME did was raise bank reserves and show money velocity collapse). There has been a subtle shift from central banks toward our view, most evident from the UK MPC, whose £200bn programme started by focusing almost purely on underlying M4, but ended differently with MPC speeches about how successful it was in keeping Gilt yields low.

    The next shock and awe will be in the form of large scale QME, but with one massive difference – it will be focused on lowering yields, not expanding money supply (I think). So do not be surprised if the next QME is about guaranteeing yields at, say, 2% 10-yr US, or lower. Even if it is a vanilla buying programme as before, expect it to focus along the curve and bring all yields down in a monster bull flattener (you cannot bring down 5s and not 30s because that just changes savings’ maturity preference, it does not deter saving). Note today’s Telegraph article alleging that the Fed are already mulling more QME of another US$2.6trn (to take their balance sheet to US$5trn), which is totally unsurprising (we think CBs are far more dovish worldwide than investors/investment banks are). Others will follow. We are getting more bond bullish, not less.”

    Wow.  I don’t really know what to say about that….

    Source: RBS

    The content on this site is provided as general information only and should not be taken as investment advice. All site content shall not be construed as a recommendation to buy or sell any security or financial product, or to participate in any particular trading or investment strategy. The ideas expressed on this site are solely the opinions of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the opinions of firms affiliated with the author(s). The author(s) may or may not have a position in any security referenced herein. Any action that you take as a result of information or analysis on this site is ultimately your responsibility. Consult your investment adviser before making any investment decisions.

    Very bearish report from RBS.

    Posted via email from Global Macro Blog

    6.29.2010

    FT.com | Eric Posner - Echoes of subprime ring out across Greek crisis

    In June 1992, Greece issued five-year bonds with a face value of $250m at a rate of 8.25 per cent. The spread between the five year Greek bond and the equivalent German Bund was roughly 228 basis points. Greece had a deficit of 11.5 per cent of GDP and a debt to GDP ratio of 110 per cent. Its S&P credit rating was a miserable BBB-.

    In June 2008, Greece issued five-year bonds with a face value of $1.5bn, at an interest rate of 4.625 per cent. This time the spread with the equivalent German Bund was only 113bps, half of what it had been in 1992. Greece’s S&P rating was now a respectable A. Yet the underlying numbers had not improved that much. The deficit was 5 per cent of GDP and the ratio of debt to GDP was 98 per cent. And Greece was known to have fudged its financial health in official data.

    There’s more. In the early 1990s, Greek debt contracts had numerous provisions that protected creditors from default. The debt contracts gave bondholders the right to accelerate upon an event of default. They committed Greece to membership in the International Monetary Fund and access to IMF funding — which meant monitoring by the IMF. And it appears (although it is hard to verify) that a major portion of Greece’s external debt was governed by some combination of English and US law. In the early 1990s, the credit market treated Greece as a third world country — like Ecuador or Venezuela.

    By 2006, the contractual protections for external creditors had been narrowed. In its English law bonds, the right of acceleration could now be exercised only with the consent of bondholders holding 25 per cent of the outstanding debt. Greece also no longer had to retain membership in the IMF with access to its lines of credit. Most important, a large fraction of the bonds held by external creditors was now governed by Greek law. This meant that Greece could unilaterally restructure the debt simply by changing its law. Investors had promoted Greece from third-world debtor to first-world debtor while its finances remained third-world.

    What could account for this change? Greece joined the eurozone in 2001. But why should the market have cared that Greece entered the eurozone when its finances did not improve?

    The answer is probably that the market believed that either eurozone countries would discipline Greece’s financial excesses or bail out Greece if they failed. If so, the irony is palpable. Greece (like most other eurozone countries) did not comply with a treaty provision requiring financial discipline but was allowed into the eurozone anyway. Investors must have reasoned that if the treaty provision governing financial discipline could be ignored, then the treaty provision banning bail-outs could be ignored as well. And they were right. But if the treaty could be ignored, then why would entering a treaty make a difference to Greece’s creditworthiness in the first place?

    We suspect that the story is about politics, not economics. In their effort to press forward with European integration, political elites sought monetary union in the hope that it would forge bonds between still mutually suspicious nationalities. But monetary (and political) union cannot succeed when vast disparities of wealth exist across regions, and the people of northern European countries had no interest in correcting these disparities by transferring wealth to the south.

    Political elites squared this circle by (we suspect) encouraging national banks to buy up Greek debt despite reservations about its quality — so that transfers would take place but disguised as credit made cheap by implicit government guarantees. Apparently, the European Central Bank accepted Greek debt as collateral for loans on the same terms that it accepted the debt of more financially stable countries. European commercial banks would then devour Greek debt because it was liquid and secure, and paid a premium over the debt of safer countries — plus they received certain regulatory advantages because it was EU sovereign paper.

    The rest is history. The parallel between the Greek debt crisis and the subprime crisis is striking. Trashy debt is alchemised to gold through manipulations driven by a political agenda. In the case of subprime debt, this took the form of collateralised debt obligations consisting of government-supported mortgage-backed securities. In the case of Greek bonds, it was European Monetary Union. Subprime debt, long believed to be risky, magically becomes almost as safe as Treasury bonds. Greece, which has spent half its existence as an independent nation in default, magically becomes almost as creditworthy as Germany. In both cases, investors expected to be bailed out, and were. In both cases, politically motivated wealth transfers were disguised as cheap credit. In both cases, taxpayers who resisted cash transfers to low-income groups found out later that they had to pay for what they did not want because the alternative was financial Armageddon.

    Eric Posner is Kirkland and Ellis Professor of Law, University of Chicago. This piece was co-authored by Mitu Gulati, professor at Duke Law School

    via ft.com

    This essay from Eric Posner draws eerie and unsettling parallels between the Greek debt crisis and the collapse of US subprime mortgages. Definitely puts the scope of the ineptness that pervades the political class in nations around the world. How did modern society weave such a wickedly counter-intuitive financial system?

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